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High Performance Work Practices and Employee Voice: 
A Comparison of Japanese and Korean Workers
* 
 
Using a unique new cross-national survey of Japanese and Korean workers, we report the 
first systematic evidence on the effects on employee voice of High Performance Work 
Practices (HPWPs) from the two economies which are noted for the wide use of HPWPs. We 
find for both nations that: (i) workers in firms with HPWPs aimed at creating opportunities for 
employees to get involved (such as shopfloor committees and small group activities) are 
indeed more likely to have stronger senses of influence and voice on shopfloor decision 
making than other workers; (ii) workers whose pay is tied to firm performance are more likely 
to have a stake in firm performance and hence demand such influence and voice; and (iii) 
consequently workers in firms with HPWPs are more likely to make frequent suggestions for 
productivity increase and quality improvement. As such, this paper contributes to a small yet 
growing new empirical literature which tries to understand the actual process and mechanism 
through which HPWPs lead to better enterprise performance. 
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High Performance Work Practices and Employee Voice:  
A Comparison of Japanese and Korean Workers 
 
I. Introduction 
One of the most important changes in workplaces in Japan, the U.S., and other 
industrialized countries in the last two decades or so is the emergence of a new work system 
often called the High Performance Work System.
1 In stark contrast to the traditional employment 
system, the High Performance Work System is based on a fundamentally different premise that 
frontline workers can play a significant role in enhancing the firm’s overall competitiveness in 
the market.
2 First, frontline workers acquire a variety of local knowledge through their frequent 
interactions with their equipments in the case of manufacturing sector and their customers in the 
case of service sector. Some of such local knowledge may prove to be a significant source of 
competitive edge for the firm (e.g., implementing a series of small yet useful ideas to improve 
productivity, quality, and customer satisfaction and reduce costs may eventually help the firm 
out-compete its rivals). In addition, the accumulation of such local knowledge tends to be most 
effective when frontline workers collaborate with each other and engage in knowledge sharing.  
Second, the firm encounters a variety of shocks. Some of such shocks are local in nature 
and dealt with most effectively by frontline workers themselves without involving formal and 
inevitably time-consuming interventions from higher-level management and engineers. Such 
                                                 
1 Calling the new work system the “high performance” work system might give some readers an 
impression that there is overwhelmingly strong evidence for the significant performance-enhancing effect of 
such a system. As discussed below, researchers are still debating the reliability of such evidence and new 
evidence is still being reported. We use the term “high performance” only because it is rather well established 
in the literature.  
2 We define frontline workers broadly, including all workers who are working in trenches, regularly 
interacting with machines in the case of manufacturing and customers in the case of service (such as machine 
operators, customer service representatives, sales professionals, and lower-level engineers and managers).     2
local adjustments to shocks by frontline workers are often most successful when they collaborate 
with each other.
3  
In short, the High Performance Work System uses a variety of complementary new work 
practices (often called High Performance Work Practices, HPWPs) and taps into the ability of 
frontline workers to produce valuable local knowledge through their collective efforts and share 
it with management; and deal with local shocks autonomously through collaboration among 
themselves. Such diverse HPWPs can be grouped into the following three key elements of the 
High Performance Work System.
4  
Opportunities: First, in the High Performance Work System, front-line workers will be given 
opportunities to exert discretionary effort, acquire useful local knowledge, and share it with their 
co-workers, and higher-level engineers and managers.  Various types of teams are used to create 
such opportunities for front-line workers as well as to deal with local shocks autonomously.  The 
importance of providing such opportunities is self-explanatory.  After all, a key objective of the 
High Performance Work System is to tap into frontline workers’ discretional effort and ability to 
produce valuable local information and deal with local shocks. Without such opportunities, there 
will not be any performance gain. 
Incentives: Providing workers with such opportunities to produce useful local knowledge and 
share it with management is not sufficient. Obviously if the interest of workers is not aligned 
with that of the firm, workers will have little incentive to put force effort and produce 
performance-enhancing local information and share it with management.  The interest alignment 
between workers and the firm is fostered by two types of human resource management policies: 
(i) financial participation schemes (such as employee stock ownership, profit sharing, 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Koike (2005).   
4 See, for instance, Kochan and Osterman, 1994, Appelbaum, et. al. 2000 and Boning, Ichniowski and 
Shaw, 2007.    3
gainsharing, and broad-based stock option) by which the financial wellbeing of workers is more 
tied to the final wellbeing of the firm; and (ii) information sharing mechanisms through which 
management shares important information with workers, and fosters their loyalty and 
commitment to the firm.
5   
Ability: Finally, even if frontline workers are given an opportunity to produce valuable local 
knowledge and share it with management AND have the appropriate incentive to do so, such 
useful local information may never be generated or shared widely in the firm in the absence of 
appropriate ability and skill of workers. As such, careful screening and recruitment are often an 
integral part of the High Performance Work System.  
There is an enormous amount of previous empirical work by economists in this broad 
area and especially as it concerns the impact of such new work practices upon business 
performance.
6  However, for the most part the empirical economics literature has not paid 
detailed attention to the actual process/mechanism through which HPWPs result in better 
enterprise performance.  In other words, we know much about whether HPWPs improve 
                                                 
5 In addition, job security can be an important necessary condition for the High Performance Work 
System.  For instance, local knowledge accumulated through collaboration of frontline workers is often firm-
specific in nature, and its value will be considerably lower outside of the firm. As such, in the absence of the 
practice of long-term employment, frontline workers will have less incentive to accumulate such firm-specific 
human capital. Furthermore, even if workers obtain valuable local knowledge, they may not share it in the 
absence of long-term employment. For example, performance-enhancing local knowledge discovered by 
frontline workers may result in labor-saving technological change.  Imagine that a frontline worker has just 
discovered a way to perform his/her job more quickly and thus afford performing his/her co-worker’s job as 
well.  This may result in a loss of his/her co-worker’s job or even worse his/her own job (which is now 
performed by his/her co-worker).  Unless some degree of job security is credibly assured, the frontline worker 
will have an incentive not to reveal such performance-enhancing local information with management.
 For the 
importance of job security in the participatory employment system such as the Japanese system, see for 
example Levine (1995) and Carmichael and MacLeod (1993). 
6 See, for example, Huselid and Becker (1996), Dunlop and Weil (1996), Berg (1996),  Ichniowski, 
Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Freeman, Kleiner, and Ostroff (2000), Cappelli and Neumark (2001), Hamilton, 
Nickerson and Owan (2003), Boning, Ichniowski , and Shaw (2007), Black and Lynch (2001, 2004), and 
Bartel (2004) for the U.S.; Jones and Kato (1995) and Kato and Morishima (2002) for Japan; Leoni, et. al. 
(2001) for Italy; Addison and Belfield (2000); Conyon and Freeman (2001); and DeVaro (2006), and 
Heywood, Jirjahn, and Wei (2008) for the U.K.; Eriksson (2003) for Denmark; Jones, Kalmi and Kauhanen 
(2006) for Finland; Bayo-Moriones, et. al. (2003) for Spain; and Zwick (2004) for Germany. In addition to the 
economics literature, there is a wealth of relevant literature in the field of management (see, for example, 
Lawler, Mohrman and Ledford, 1995 and Becker and Huselid, 1998).    4
performance but we know little about how they do it.  There are, however, a handful of studies 
that do make important steps in beginning to uncover such processes/mechanisms.  First, a 
number of pioneering studies (e.g.  Lazear, 2000, Kleiner and Helper, 2003, Fernie and Metcalf, 
1999, Paarsh and Shearer, 1999, and Knez and Simester, 2001), focus on the effects on 
individual worker performance of the switch from time rates to piece rates or to performance 
pay, and provide direct evidence on the impact of performance pay upon individual worker 
behavior.  A related line of work examines the effects on individual worker performance of the 
shift to team production (e.g. Batt, 1999 and Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2002).  Grant, 
Ichniowski and Shaw (2002) studies the impact of HPWPs on the nature of social networks and 
knowledge sharing among workers.   
This paper contributes to this small yet growing literature on how HPWPs work.  
Specifically as we argued above, the High Performance Work System taps into each frontline 
worker’s initiative, creativity and resourcefulness.  To do so, the firm will need to foster a strong 
sense of empowerment and voice among workers by making each worker feel that: (i) his/her 
input counts; (ii) he/she is indeed provided with real substantive opportunities to participate and 
influence shopfloor decision making; and (iii) he/she actually take advantage of such 
opportunities to make suggestions to his/her boss concerning how to raise productivity and 
improve quality.  In this paper, we investigate empirically whether HPWPs are indeed 
contributing to the development of such a strong sense of employee empowerment and voice in 
Japan and Korea.   
Traditionally both Korean and Japanese firms subscribed to the East Asian model of 
industrial relations, characterized by long-term employment, seniority-based wage and 
promotion system, enterprise-level unions, and HPWPs.  In recent years, however, Japan and 
Korea appeared to have parted; Japan maintaining its cooperative labor-management system in   5
the main
7 while Korea adopting the Anglo-American model of flexible labor market with more 
active external labor markets, accompanied by more confrontational and adversarial labor-
management relations.
8   
Section II introduces a new cross-national survey of workers, the Asian Worker 
Representation and Participation Survey which provides us with unique, reliable, and cross-
national data for Japan and Korea (it is our intention to expand the scope of the Survey to other 
Asian countries in the future).  In the following two sections, using the new data, we contrast 
between the two nations the strength of employee influence and voice on key decision making 
areas at the shopfloor level, employee demand for such influence and voice, and employee 
willingness to make productivity-enhancing and quality-improving suggestions.  Sections V-VII 
present the ordered probit estimates on the possible impact of HPWPs upon employee voice and 
grassroots innovation, followed by concluding remarks.                
 
II. Asian Worker Representation and Participation Survey 
With full collaboration with Denki Rengo (Japanese Electrical, Electronic, Information 
Union), the Japanese team consisting of Chuma, Kato and Ohashi conducted the Japanese 
Worker Representation and Participation Survey during December 2003-January 2004. We held 
numerous meetings with experienced full-time research staff of Denki Rengo, and carefully 
developed the survey instrument, modeling after the U.S. Worker Representation and 
Participation Survey (Freeman and Rogers, 1999). After a pilot phase in which an earlier version 
of the instrument was tested, the questionnaire was finalized. In consultation with Denki Rengo’s 
                                                 
7 For the enduring nature of Japanese employment practices, see for instance Kato (2001, 2003) and 
Genda and Rebick (2000).   
8 See Cho (2005) as well as various papers presented at a recent international symposium SEEKING 
A VISION FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT REFORM TO ENHANCE COMPETITIVENESS, sponsored by 
the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, Seoul, Nov. 3, 2005 
(http://www.kiet.re.kr/UpFile/newsbrief/1133775182921.pdf).       6
research department, among 659,729 workers who belong to Denki Rengo, 3,000 workers were 
randomly selected and asked to participate in the Survey. The Survey was competently 
administered by Denki Rengo’s research department, which is known for their expertise and long 
and successful experience on administrating such worker surveys. Notably, as in the case of 
numerous surveys that they administered in the past, the privacy of individual respondents was 
strictly protected throughout the survey process. Usable responses were obtained from 2,611 
workers (a response rate of 87 percent).  The impressive 87 percent response rate makes the 
unionized worker sample unusually reliable.     
Our selection of the electrical, electronic and information industries was motivated in part 
by Denki Rengo’s strong willingness to cooperate with us.  It was, however, also motivated by 
the fact that the electrical, electronic and information industries are generally considered as one 
of the twin engines of Japan’s export machine.
9   Whatever happens to these industries will have 
serious consequences on the overall health of the Japanese economy.  
To construct a matching sample of workers in firms without union, we used one of the 
most reputable survey research firms in Japan, Nikkei Research Inc (a full service research 
company of Nihon Keizai Shinbun Group). Nikkei Research randomly selected 2,275 workers 
who work in non-unionized firms in the same electrical, electronic and information industries, 
and asked each worker to respond to the Japanese WRPS (a few questions were modified to 
reflect the fact that the sample universe is non-union workers). Usable responses were received 
from 445 workers (a response rate of 19.6 percent).  The response rate of 19.6 percent is 
comparable to most surveys of similar nature in Japan.       
                                                 
9 For instance, according to Japan Statistical Yearbook (2004), about 50 percent of total export from 
Japan was equally split between the electrical, electronic and information industries and the transportation 
equipment industry.  We are currently planning to repeat the JWRPS in other industries in Japan.      7
In 2006 the Korean team (Bae, Kato and Kim) carefully replicated the Japanese WRPS in 
Korea.  Specifically, with full cooperation from the Korea Labor Institute and Metal Union, the 
team completed the Korean WRPS in February of 2006.  Among all workers who belong to 
Metal Union, 2,400 workers were randomly chosen and asked to participate in the Survey. As in 
the case of the Japanese Survey, the privacy of individual respondents was strictly protected 
throughout the Korean survey process. Usable responses were obtained from 1,744 of them, 
amounting to yet another impressive response rate of 73 percent.   
To construct a matching sample of workers in firms without union, like in the case of the 
Japanese Survey, the Korean research team randomly selected 822 workers who work in non-
unionized firms in the same electrical, electronic and information industries. Usable responses 
were received from 574 of them (an equally impressive response rate of 70 percent).  The 
unusually high response rate for the non-union sample makes the Korean WRPS especially 
attractive for comparative studies between union and non-union workers.   
In short, by construction, we have an unusually comparable pair of datasets from the two 
important economies in Asia (the second and fifteenth largest economies in the world according 
to the most recent IMF ranking of GDP).  In this paper, we exclude full-time union 
representatives who work for unions (and hence do not do any regular work for the firms) and 
are paid not by the firms but by unions.  First, after all we are interested in the perspectives of 
regular workers not full-time union leaders.  Second, such full-time union officials were over-
represented in the Japanese WRPS whereas no such over-representation is evident in the Korean 
WRPS.
10   
                                                 
10 There were 521 full-time union officers in the initial Japanese sample where there were 172 in the 
initial Korean sample.     8
The basic worker characteristics in both nations are presented in Table 1.   As the table 
shows, Japanese workers are older than Korean workers (36 vs. 30).  The Japanese tradition of 
“hiring new graduates” appears to be still live and well.  The proportion of workers who joined 
their current firms after working for other firms (mid-career hires) as opposed to joining right 
from high-schools or colleges (new recruits) is still less than 25 percent in Japan.  In contrast, the 
majority of Korean workers are mid-career hires.  This finding is not inconsistent with the notion 
that lately Korea has been deviating from the East Asian Model with long-term employment 
more so than Japan.   
Workers with some lower-level supervisory responsibilities are often union members 
(especially in Japan), and they are part of our target population.  As shown in Table 1 
(NORANK), a little less than 40 percent of Japanese workers in our sample do have such front-
line supervisory responsibilities whereas only 20 percent of Korean workers hold such 
responsibilities.  The difference in the proportion confirms that Japanese union shop tends to be 
more comprehensive than Korean union shop and that workers with college graduates and white-
collar workers are typically excluded from unions in Korea even from the very beginning of their 
careers whereas such college graduates and white-collar workers are included in Japanese unions 
until they become mid-level managers.   
Table 1 shows that around 30 percent of Japanese workers have some union 
responsibilities at the grassroots level although all of them carry out their regular work as full-
time employees while fulfilling union responsibilities after hours except that they are allowed to 
leave their workplaces during regular hours when attending Shopfloor Committees as shop floor 
union representatives.  Their hours absent from work due to participation in Shopfloor 
Committees are paid by unions.  The proportion of workers with such workplace union   9
responsibilities is only 1 percent in Korea since most of such front-line union leaders are of 
informal nature and they seldom considered themselves “union leaders”.     
Over 80 percent of Japanese workers are male whereas 56 percent of Korean workers are 
male.  Furthermore, a higher proportion of Japanese workers has some education beyond high 
schools than Korean workers.  The differences in educational attainment of workers between the 
two nations are reflected in the occupational composition of the labor force, i.e., over 50 percent 
of Korean workers in the sample are operators (or blue-collar) as compared to less than 25 
percent of Japanese workers in the category.  The difference in the proportion of operators 
between the two nations is again in most part due to the fact that Korean union shop is less 
comprehensive than Japanese union shop.
11   
Overall the Korean sample consists of older workers; more female workers; more blue-
collar workers; less educated workers; more mid-career hires; and fewer shopfloor union 
representatives than the Japanese sample.  Since both Japanese and Korean WRPS enjoyed 
unusually high response rates and we designed and administered the Korean WRPS, following 
the Japanese WRPS at every step of the way with bilingual staff in the team, we believe that the 
differences observed from our comparison of the Japanese and Korean samples reflect the 
population differences between the two nations.    
 
III. Employee Influence and Voice 
Following Freeman and Rogers (1999), we focus on the following four key areas of 
shopfloor decision making: (i) JOB (deciding how to do job and organize the work); (ii) GOAL 
(setting goals for work group or department); (iii) TIME (setting work schedules, including 
                                                 
11 For the non-union sample, a similar difference between the two nations is still observed since the 
non-union sample is matched with the union-sample in terms of worker characteristics.   10
breaks, overtime and time off); and (iv) TRAINING (deciding on what training is needed for 
people in work group or department).  The extent of employee influence and voice on JOB is 
measured by:  
SVOJOB = 3  if the worker tells us that he/she has a lot of involvement and influence on 
deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work;  
      = 2  if the worker tells us that he/she has some involvement and influence on  
deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work;  
      = 1  if the worker tells us that he/she has little involvement and influence on  
deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work; and  
       = 0 if the worker tells us that he/she has no involvement and influence on  
deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work.   
SVOGOL, SVOTIM, and SVOTRA are defined likewise for the other three areas of shopfloor 
decision making respectively.   
  Similarly we measure how strong employee demand for such influence and voice on JOB 
is by constructing:  
DVOJOB = 3  if the worker tells us that he/she considers it very important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the 
work;  
   = 2  if the worker tells us that he/she considers it somewhat important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the 
work;   
    = 1  if the worker tells us that he/she considers it not very important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the 
work; and    11
= 0 if the worker tells us that he/she considers it not at all important to have a lot of 
involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the 
work;.   
Likewise, we create DVOGOL, DVOTIM, and DVOTRA for the other three areas of shopfloor 
decision making respectively.   
  Finally, we create a variable PROPOS to capture the extent to which each worker takes 
advantage of the opportunities to influence shopfloor decision making and make suggestions to 
enhance productivity and improve produce quality to his/her boss.  Specifically,   
PROPOS = 3  if the worker tells us that he/she often makes suggestions to his/her boss 
concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality; 
   = 2  if the worker tells us that he/she sometimes makes suggestions to his/her boss 
concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality; 
   = 1  if the worker tells us that he/she rarely makes suggestions to his/her boss 
concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality; and  
     = 0 if the worker tells us that he/she never makes suggestions to his/her boss,   
concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality.   
  Table 2 shows the summary statistics of these influence/voice variables.  The table 
suggests that workers in both nations have the strongest sense of voice on JOB, followed by 
TIME, GOAL and then TRAINING.  Turning to differences between the two nations, Japanese 
workers have a much stronger sense of voice on JOB than the Korean counterparts whereas 
having a somewhat weaker sense of voice on TRAINING and GOAL.   
Regarding employee demand for influence and voice, workers care most about JOB in 
both countries.  Japanese workers are consistently more demanding than Korean workers in all 
four areas of shopfloor decision making.  Finally, the table shows that Japanese workers tend to   12
make suggestions to raise productivity and improve quality more frequently than their Korean 
counterparts.      
 
IV. HPWPs          
As Levine and Tyson (1990) suggest, relatively greater job security and strong group 
cohesiveness of Japanese workers in large manufacturing companies in the postwar era point to 
an industrial relations system favorable to successful employee participation.  In addition, steady 
economic growth, lower unemployment and stable financial corporate grouping point to an 
external environment favorable to successful employee participation. 
Probably as a result of these favorable environments in the postwar Japanese economy, in 
particular in manufacturing, HPWPs diffused widely and were established firmly (Kato and 
Morishima, 2002).  Indeed these practices became the hallmark of “Japanese management,” 
which has been rousing (or requiring in some instances) many U.S. corporations to experiment 
with employee involvement and labor-management cooperation lately (see, for instance, Levine, 
1995: 5). In short, the postwar Japanese economy (especially in manufacturing) clearly 
represents one of the most important examples of experimentation with HPWPs.
12  
In contrast, relatively limited information is available on the use of such practices in 
Korea (Yalabik, et. al.; 2008, Kato et al. 2005; Kim, 2004; Bae and Rowley, 2001).  In particular, 
on our reading of the literature, the Korean WRPS provides the first comprehensive data at 
individual worker level on the incidence of participatory work practices in Korea.  As such, the 
data will enable us for the first time to reveal how widely each of the key participatory 
employment practice is used among Korean workers as compared to the Japanese benchmark.        
                                                 
12 The economic slowdown in the 1990s and a rapidly aging workforce in Japan have allegedly been 
eroding the aforementioned participation-friendly environments.  See Kato (2001, 2003), Chuma (2002), and 
Ohashi and Tachibanaki (1998) for evolving employment practices in Japan.   13
As shown in Table 3, we consider six employment practices which are often considered 
key work practices of High Performance Work System of Japanese firms in the literature.
13  
Nearly 70 percent of Korean workers work for firms with Shopfloor Committees in which 
supervisors and employees on shop floor regularly discuss issues such as shop-floor operations 
and shop-floor environments.  It is actually higher than the benchmark Japanese case (about 60 
percent).  However, it appears that once introduced, Japanese Shopfloor Committees are better 
attended by workers with about one in two Japanese workers always attending Shopfloor 
Committee meetings (SFCPART=0.498) whereas only one in five Korean workers always 
attending (SFCPART=0.197)..     
Over 80 percent of Korean workers work in firms with Small Group Activities such as 
quality control (QC) circles and Zero Defects in which small groups at the workplace level 
voluntarily set plans and goals concerning operations and work together toward accomplishing 
these plans and goals.  In contrast, somewhat surprisingly, the majority of Japanese workers 
work in firms without Small Group Activities.  This is in part due to the fact that a significant 
number of Japanese firms in the industries terminated Small Group Activities in recent years.
14 
Such terminations of Small Group Activities may pose a selection issue, i.e., poorly functioning 
Small Group Activities with little positive impact on employee voice may be more likely to be 
terminated than well-functioning Small Group Activities, resulting in an overestimation of the 
voice effect of Small Group Activities. We will account for this selection issue.       
As in the case of Shopfloor Committees, however, the participation rate of workers in 
firms with Small Group Activities is remarkably high (85 percent) in Japan, confirming that 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Ohkusa and Ohtake (1997) for Profit Sharing Plans, Jones and Kato (1995) for 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Kato and Morishima (2002) for Joint Labor-Management Committees and 
Shopfloor Committees, and Kato (2003) for Small Group Activities.   
14 For a more detailed discussion on the declining Small Group Activities in Japan, see Chuma, Kato 
and Ohashi (2005).     14
Japanese Small Group Activities are indeed broad-based.  In stark contrast, the participation rate 
of Korean workers in firms with Small Group Activities is still less than 40 percent, pointing to 
the considerably narrower employee base of Korean Small Group Activities.    
One of the core mechanisms for labor-management relations within a large Japanese firm 
is Joint Labor-Management Committees.  Established at the top level (corporate and/or 
establishment level) and involving both management and union representatives, Joint Labor-
Management Committees serve as a mechanism for employee participation/involvement at the 
top level, covering a large variety of issues ranging from basic business policies to working 
conditions.
15  As Kato (2006) shows, the productivity effects of Joint Labor-Management 
Committees vary significantly, depending on how widely information shared in Joint Labor-
Management Committees is disseminated to the rank and files.  To this end, we calculate the 
proportion of workers who said that all information provided in Joint Labor-Management 
Committees is shared with them.
16  About 7 percent of Korean workers said that all information 
provided in Joint Labor-Management Committees is indeed shared with them while nearly 9 
percent of Japanese did, pointing to a somewhat narrower employee base of Korean Joint Labor-
Management Committees.   
Turning to financial participation schemes or group incentive pay, the pattern is reversed. 
Profit Sharing Plans which link at least a portion of employee pay to a measure of firm-wide 
performance (such as profit) are extremely wide spread among Japanese workers (over 80 
percent of workers currently under Profit Sharing Plans) whereas the comparable figure for 
Korea is only 66 percent.   
                                                 
15 See, for example, Kato (2006) for detailed institutional information on Joint Labor-Management 
Committees.   
16 For both nations, nearly all workers work for firms with Joint Labor-Management Committees. In 
Japan Joint Labor-Management Committees are one of the most established employment practices, and in 
Korea they are mandatory under the Korean law.         15
We expect non-financial participation mechanisms such as Shopfloor Committees, Small 
Group Activities and Joint Labor-Management Committees to enhance an employee sense of 
involvement and influence since after all the main objective of these institutions is to foster 
employee voice.   
On the other hand, we expect financial participation schemes (Profit Sharing Plans) to 
nurture employee interest and desire to have involvement and influence in shopfloor decisions, 
for a key function of financial participation schemes is to align the interest of workers with the 
interest of the firm.  Such goal alignments will make employees more interested in firm 
performance and thus involvement and influence on firm decisions.   
 
V. HPWPs and Voice 
To test our hypothesis that HPWPs aiming at providing workers with opportunities to 
participate enhance employee voice, we specify the following Ordered Probit model: 
(1)     Pr(SVOJOB=j for j=0,1,2, and 3) = F(γHPWP, Xß) 
(2)     Pr(SVOGOL=j for j=0,1,2, and 3) = F(γHPWP, Xß) 
(3)     Pr(SVOTIM=j for j=0,1,2, and 3) = F(γHPWP, Xß) 
(4)     Pr(SVOTRA=j for j=0,1,2, and 3) = F(γHPWP, Xß) 
As explained in Section III, SVOJOB, SVOGOL, SVOTIM and SVOTRA measure the strength 
of employee influence and voice on job, goal, schedule, and training respectively.  For HPWP, as 
discussed above, we consider three major programs used widely by large firms in Japan and 
Korea: (i) SFC (=1 if the employee works in a firm with Shopfloor Committees, 0 otherwise); 
(ii) SGA (=1 if the employee works in a firm with Small Group Activities, 0 otherwise); and (iii) 
JLMC (=1 if the employee believes that nearly all information shared in Joint Labor-
Management Committees is made available to him/her, 0 otherwise).  In addition, among those   16
in firms with Shopfloor Committees, the data further allow us to create SFCPART (=1 if the 
employee almost always attends Shopfloor Committee meetings, 0 otherwise).  Likewise, among 
those in firms with Small Group Activities, the data allow for the use of SGAPART (=1 if the 
employee participates in Small Group Activities, 0 otherwise).   
The statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on each HPWP variable, γ is of 
our main interest.  That γ>0 supports our hypothesis that HPWPs enhance employee voice.  Xi is 
a vector of variables that may affect the voice variables.  The WPRS provides us with a rich set 
of such control variables.  First, whether or not the worker has some front-line supervisory 
responsibilities is likely to be correlated with his/her sense of influence and voice.  As such, we 
consider a dummy variable NORANK (=1 if the worker has no supervisory responsibilities, 0 
otherwise).     
A similar argument could be made for union responsibilities.  Thus, to control for the 
possible effects on voice of having union responsibilities, we also consider a dummy variable 
ULBOT (=1 if the worker is a grassroots-level union representative, 0 otherwise).   
Conceivably the level of voice differs between different occupations.  To control for 
possible cross-occupational differences in worker voice, we consider four occupational dummy 
variables: (i) BLUE (=1 if the employee is working in production as an operator or a 
maintenance worker, 0 otherwise (omitted as a reference group in the regressions). (ii) 
ENGINEER (=1 if the employee is an engineer or a scientist, 0 otherwise; (iii) STAFF (=1 if the 
employee is an office staff member, 0 otherwise); and (iv) SALES (=1 if the employee is a 
salesperson, 0 otherwise).     17
Finally we include standard biographical characteristics such as AGE; MIDCAR; MALE; 
HIGHEDU; and UNION.
17  ß is a vector of unknown coefficients; and F(.) is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function.  
Some students of employee involvement argue that the existence of mechanisms for 
voice can forestall the erosion of worker bargaining power (see, for instance, Hill, Indergaard, 
and Fujita, 1989), while others argue that these mechanisms aid in such erosion (see, for example, 
Parker and Slaughter, 1988). To shed light on such possible interplay between unions and 
employee involvement programs such as Shopfloor Committees, Small Group Activities, and 
Joint Labor-Management Committees, we will also estimate Eq. (1) - (4), augmented by an 
interaction term involving UNION and HPWP. For example, finding both the estimated 
coefficient on HPWP and the estimated coefficient on the interaction term involving UNION and 
HPWP to be positive and significant will imply that unions and employee involvement 
complement each other in enhancing employee voice (or HPWP will enhance voice AND the 
voice-enhancing effect of HPWP will be greater in the presence of unions than in their absence).  
The maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (1)-Eq. (4) with Shopfloor Committee as a 
HPWP variable are reported in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.  The estimated coefficients on SFC are all 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for both Japan and Korea.  As such, we 
find consistent evidence supporting our hypothesis that workers in firms with Shopfloor 
Committee exhibit significantly stronger voice than other workers.  This significant linkage 
between Shopfloor Committees and voice is found for all four areas of shopfloor decision 
making and for both Japan and Korea.  In addition, to test the statistical significance of the 
differences between Japan and Korea, we create a dummy variable, KOREA (=1 if the worker 
works for Korean firms, 0 otherwise).  We then pool the Japanese and Korean samples and re-
                                                 
17 Tenure is not included, for it is highly correlated with AGE.     18
estimate the ordered probit model, augmented by a full set of interaction terms involving each 
independent variable and KOREA.  The estimated coefficients on such interaction terms reveal 
that Japanese Shopfloor Committees appear to have stronger impact on employee voice on goal 
and training than Korean Shopfloor Committees.  The finding appears to be consistent with: (i) 
our earlier finding that Japanese Shopfloor Committees are more broad-based than Korean 
Shopfloor Committees (the majority of Japanese workers in firms with Shopfloor Committees 
almost always attending Shopfloor Committees while only one in five Korean workers in firms 
with Shopfloor Committees do); and (ii) evidence from comparative field research at Japanese 
and Korean manufacturing firms (Kato, et. al., 2005).       
Many of the control variables also turn out to be statistically significantly related to 
worker voice.  Specifically, voice is found to be consistently greater for both Japanese and 
Korean workers with supervisory responsibilities; for male workers; and for workers with union 
responsibilities.        
As discussed above, we also estimated Eq. (1) – (4), augmented by the interaction term, 
UNION*SFC to further explore the possible interplay between unions and Shopfloor 
Committees. As shown in Table 4.3, overall we do not find any systematic evidence on the 
interplay between unions and Shopfloor Committees. The only exception is the Korean result on 
voice on training, i.e., the positive and significant effect on voice on training of Shopfloor 
Committees is found significantly smaller in the presence of unions than in their absence in 
Korea. Insofar as the effect on voice on training of Korean Shopfloor Committees is concerned, 
unions and shopfloor employee involvement might be working against each other. However, 
since we do not find such a negative relationship between Shopfloor Committees and unions for 
voice on any of the remaining three important areas of decision (jobs, goals, and scheduling) in   19
Korea and find no such relationship at all for Japan, we ought not to draw any definitive 
conclusion.      
Tables 5-1 and 5-2 present similar results when using SGA as alternative HPWP 
variables.  Specifically, we find consistently for all four areas of decision making and for both 
Japan and Korea that the estimated coefficients on SGA are positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level, supporting that workers in firms with Small Group Activities are more 
likely to have strong voice (or the significant impact on voice of Small Group Activities).  As in 
the case of Shopfloor Committees, we find some evidence for a greater effect of Japanese Small 
Group Activities upon voice on TRAINING which is consistent with our earlier finding that 
Japanese Small Group Activities are more broad-based than Korean Small Group Activities (85 
percent of Japanese workers in firms with Small Group Activities are involved with Small Group 
Activities while the Korean figure is only 40 percent) as well as evidence from comparative field 
research (Kato, et. al., 2005). 
As discussed earlier, the termination of Small Group Activities ceased to be a rare event 
in recent years, especially in Japan. If poorly-functioning Small Group Activities with little 
positive effect on employee voice are more likely to be terminated than well-functioning Small 
Group Activities, the estimated positive effect on voice of Small Group Activities will be biased 
upward, or overstating the “true” effect on voice of Small Group Activities. Fortunately the 
Survey asks each respondent whether he/she works in a firm that does not have Small Group 
Activities currently yet used to have them. To use this information, we create an alternative 
Small Group Activities variable, SGAALL=1 if a worker works in a firm that has Small Group 
Activities currently or used to have Small Group Activities, 0 otherwise, and reestimate Eq. (1) – 
(4), using SGAALL instead of SGA. As shown in Table 5-3, reassuringly the estimated   20
coefficients on SGAALL are broadly consistent with those on SGA as reported in Tables 5-1 and 
5-2, suggesting that the aforementioned selection bias may not be too severe.
18  
As we did for Shopfloor Committees, we also explore the possible interplay between 
unions and Small Group Activities by estimating Eq. (1) – (4), augmented by the interaction term, 
UNION*SGA. Again, we failed to find any systematic evidence for the interplay between unions 
and Small Group Activities (see Table 5-4). The only exception is that in Korea unions appear to 
have a negative effect on voice on training (the estimated coefficient on UNION is negative and 
significant) yet such a negative union effect on voice is tempered by the use of Small Group 
Activities (the estimated coefficient on UNION*SGA is positive and significant).  
The results for Joint Labor-Management Committees as shown in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 are 
largely consistent with those for Shopfloor Committees and Small Group Activities although 
slightly weaker.  Thus, the estimated coefficients on JLMC are positive for all eight cases (four 
areas of decision making times two countries), and statistically significant for three out of four 
areas in Korea (job, goal and schedule) and two out of four areas in Japan (job and schedule).  
Workers in firms with full-information sharing Joint Labor-Management Committees are more 
likely to have stronger voice than other workers. Again, we estimate Eq. (1) – (4) with 
UNION*JLMC added and find no systematic evidence for the interplay between unions and 
Joint Labor-Management Committees with full information sharing (Table 6-3). For Japan, 
however, concerning employee voice on goal setting and scheduling, the positive voice effect of 
Joint Labor-Management Committees is found greater for workers in non-union firms than for 
workers in unionized firms (as implied by the negative and significant coefficients on 
                                                 
18 The estimated coefficient on voice on training of Korean Small Group Activities appears to fall 
discernibly and become insignificant when SGAALL is used.  However, the estimated coefficient on voice on 
training of Korean Small Group Activities when SGA used was significant only at the 10 percent level to begin 
with, and a somewhat large standard error makes it difficult to draw any definitive conclusion for the case of voice 
on training in Korea.      21
UNION*JLMC). Our finding of the greater voice effect of Joint Labor-Management Committees 
in the non-union sector as compared to the union sector is not inconsistent with the literature on 
Japanese industrial relations which tends to point to the importance of Joint Labor-Management 
Committees as a de facto collective bargaining mechanism for workers in non-union firms in 
Japan (see, for instance, Koike, 1977).  
The most recent Labor-Management Communication Survey (conducted by the Ministry 
of Health, Labor and Welfare in 2004) also provides some institutional information on Joint 
Labor-Management Committees, which appears to be supportive of our finding.
19 For example, 
according to the Survey, for non-union establishments, fully 73 percent of all establishments 
with Joint Labor-Management Committees consider “wages and bonuses” a regular item to be 
discussed during their Joint Labor-Management Committee meetings (the figure for unionized 
establishment is 91 percent). Likewise, 75 percent of all non-union establishments with Joint 
Labor-Management Committees consider “overtime premium” a regular discussion item; 88 
percent “fringe benefits”; and 91 percent “work schedules” (the figures for unionized 
establishments are 80 percent; 87 percent; and 93 percent respectively). Furthermore, 73 percent 
of all non-union establishments with Joint Labor-Management Committees have at least one of 
their employee representatives elected by employees. Though Joint Labor-Management 
Committees in the non-union sector lacks the right to strike, and hence their bargaining power is 
in principle weaker than formal unions, they appear to provide Japanese workers in the non-
union sector with a potentially important opportunity to voice.       
Next, to see if the results change much when we consider all three HPWPs together, we 
estimate the ordered probit models with SFC, SGA and JLMC considered simultaneously.  As 
                                                 
19 The sample universe of this survey is establishments of firms with more than 30 workers, and has been 
enjoying an unusually high response rate (around 70 percent).   22
shown in Tables 7-1 and 7-2, the significant linkage between HPWPs and voice is mostly robust 
to such nested specifications.  Specifically, holding SGA and JLMC constant, workers in firms 
with Shopfloor Committees are still found to have significantly stronger voice on all four areas 
of shopfloor decision making.  This finding is unique neither to Japan nor to Korea.  Likewise, 
holding SFC and JLMC constant, we still find that workers in firms with Small Group Activities 
are more likely to have stronger voice (on all four areas for Japan and on two areas for Korea).  
Finally, after controlling for SFC and SGA, workers in firms with full information sharing Joint 
Labor-Management Committees are still found to have stronger influence (on three of four areas 
for Korea and two out of four areas for Japan).     
Finally, to see if active participants in Shopfloor Committees and Small Group Activities 
differ significantly in their senses of voice from other workers in firms with such programs, we 
focus on all workers in firms with Shopfloor Committees (Small Group Activities) and estimate 
the ordered probit models with SFCPART (SGAPART) as a HPWP variable.  Tables 8-1 and 8-2 
report the maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (1)-Eq. (4) with SFCPART as a HPWP variable 
and Tables 9-1 and 9-2 with SGAPART as a HPWP variable.  The estimated coefficients on 
SFCPART are positive and significant at the 1 percent level for all four areas of shopfloor 
decision making and for both nations except for one case (significant at the 10 percent level for 
voice on schedule for Korea).  Participants in Shopfloor Committees are indeed more likely to 
have stronger voice on all four areas and for both countries.
20  We also find evidence that the 
association between SFCPART and voice on schedule is significantly stronger in Japan than in 
Korea.        
                                                 
20 Causal interpretations are particularly difficult here, for it is plausible that workers with strong 
senses of voice are more likely to participate in those programs.       23
Similar results are found for SGAPART.  The estimated coefficients on SGAPART are 
positive and significant at least at the 10 percent level for all four areas of decision making and 
for both countries.  Again there is evidence that participants in Japanese Small Group Activities 
are more likely to have stronger voice on training than those in Korean Small Group Activities.   
 
VI. Demand for Voice and Group Incentive Pay 
To test whether HPWPs aiming at providing workers with group incentive pay such as 
Profit Sharing Plans make workers desire stronger voice, we specify the following Ordered 
Probit model: 
(5)     Pr(DVOJOB=j for j=0,1,2, and 3) = F(γPSP, Xß) 
(6)     Pr(DVOGOL=j for j=0,1,2, and 3) = F(γPSP, Xß) 
(7)     Pr(DVOTIM=j for j=0,1,2, and 3) = F(γPSP, Xß) 
(8)     Pr(DVOTRA=j for j=0,1,2, and 3) = F(γPSP, Xß) 
DVOJOB, DVOGOL, DVOTIM, and DVOTRA capture the strength of employee demand for 
influence and voice on job, goal, schedule and training (see Section III for precise definitions).  
For HPWP aiming at group incentive, we consider the most widely used program, Profit Sharing 
Plans, PSP(=1 if the employee’s compensation includes profit sharing bonus which is linked to 
firm performance, 0 otherwise).  For control variables, X, we use the same set of variables used 
in the previous section.   Finally, ß is a vector of unknown coefficients; and F(.) is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. 
  Tables 10-1 and 10-2 summarize the maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (5)-Eq. (8).  
For Japanese workers, the estimated coefficients on PSP are positive and significant at the 5 
percent level when we use voice on job (DVOJOB) in the dependent variable and at the 1 
percent level when voice on training (DVOTRA) used.  On the other hand, we find no   24
statistically significant linkage between Profit Sharing Plans and demand for voice in any area of 
shopfloor decision making for Korean workers. The contrast between the two nations appears to 
be consistent with our field research at Japanese and Korean manufacturing firms which 
demonstrates the narrower scope and smaller magnitude of Profit Sharing Plans in Korea as 
compared to Japan.  Most consistent among results on control variables is negative associations 
between demand for voice and NORANK, confirming that workers with supervisory 
responsibilities tend to demand stronger voice in both nations.     
 
VII. HPWPs and Employee Suggestions               
  We conclude our analysis by examining whether HPWPs aiming at providing front-line 
workers with grassroots innovation opportunities, combined with group incentive pay (Profit 
Sharing Plans), lead to active grassroots innovation.  To this end, we estimate the following 
ordered probit model: 
(9)   Pr(PROPOS=j for j=0, 1, 2, and 3) = F(HPWPγ, Xß) 
PROPOS measures the frequency of employee suggestions to raise productivity and improve 
product quality as explained in Section III.
21  For HPWPs, as we did in the previous sections, we 
consider Shopfloor Committees, Small Group Activities and Joint Labor-Management 
Committees with full information sharing as HPWPs designed to create opportunities to innovate 
at the grassroots level; and Profit Sharing Plans as a group incentive scheme. We use the same 
set of control variables, X.        
It is self-explanatory how Shopfloor Committees and Small Group Activities generate 
opportunities for front-line workers to make productivity-enhancing and quality-improving 
                                                 
21 Ideally we should also use a variable capturing the quality of employee suggestions. Unfortunately 
we have no reliable data on such suggestion quality.     25
suggestions.  Joint Labor-Management Committees are, however, a form of representative 
participation, and it is not obvious how they help continuous improvement at the grassroots level.   
To illustrate vividly how well-functioning Joint Labor-Management Committees with 
broad-employee base can facilitate front-line innovation activities, let us introduce one of our 
Korean field research sites, K-firm.  K-firm is a large manufacturing firm and workers from this 
firm are respondents to our Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey.  First, K-
firm has Joint Labor-Management Committees at the headquarter level as well as at the plant 
level.  The headquarter level Joint Labor-Management  Committee meets formally every quarter 
as the Korean law requires while the plant-level Joint Labor-Management  Committee meets 
formally every month.  The headquarter-level Joint Labor-Management Committee consists of 
equal number of management and labor representatives as the law mandates (10 council 
members from each side).   The plant-level Joint Labor-Management Committee consists of 
plant manager, plant HR director, and other managers as management representatives and plant-
level union leaders as labor representatives (line supervisors are often plant-level union 
representatives).   
  The plant-level Joint Labor-Management Committee meetings are often devoted to 
serious discussions on how to enhance productivity, improve product quality, and out-compete 
its major international competitors (mostly Japanese).  According to the General Secretary of K-
firm’s union, factor-level union leaders, many of whom are not full time union leaders, spend on 
average 10 hours a month on preparing for monthly factory-level Joint Labor-Management 
Committee meetings.  The company allows them to do this during their regular working hours.  
In other words, as in the case of full-time union leaders, these shopfloor union leaders are also 
paid for their Joint Labor-Management Committee-related activities by the company.    26
Recently K-firm’s Joint Labor-Management Committees spent much time dealing with a 
recent product recall incidence.  A serious product defect and reported consumer injuries caused 
by the defect were revealed to labor representatives for Joint Labor-Management Committee 
before the public disclosure of such potentially devastating information.  Labor representatives 
for Joint Labor-Management Committee using both formal and informal channels solicited ideas 
from general union membership (front-line workers) how to deal with the company crisis.  Based 
on various ideas suggested by local members, labor representatives for Joint Labor-Management 
Committee subsequently made two specific proposals to management representatives: (i) 
volunteering union representatives (shop stewards) to join the firm’s recall team as servicemen; 
and (ii) running a newspaper ad apologizing for the product defect.  These proposals were 
accepted and implemented by the firm successfully. K-firm’s Joint Labor-Management 
Committees proved to be a potent catalyst for such effective “bottom-up” solutions (Note that 
these solutions originated from front-line workers).      
  The maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (9) are presented in Table 11.  The estimated 
coefficients on SFC, SGA and PSP are positive and significant at the 1 percent level for Japanese 
workers.  Japanese workers with the presence of group incentive created by Profit Sharing Plans 
and grassroots innovation opportunities furnished by Shopfloor Committees and Small Group 
Activities are indeed found to be more frequently making productivity-enhancing and quality-
improving suggestions than other Japanese workers.  For Korean workers, to be consistent with 
the results in the previous section, we find no statistically significant link between group 
incentive pay (Profit Sharing Plans) and the frequency of employee suggestions.  On the other 
hand, the estimated coefficients on SFC and JLMC are positive and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level, suggesting that Korean workers with local innovation opportunities created by   27
Shopfloor Committees and Joint Labor-Management Committees are more prone to make 
suggestions to raise productivity and improve quality than other Korean workers.   
  The difference in the impact on PROPOS of SGA, JLMC and PSP between the two 
nations turns out to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that Japanese 
Small Group Activities and Profit Sharing Plans are more effective in promoting employee 
suggestions than Korean Small Group Activities and Profit Sharing Plans whereas Korean Joint 
Labor-Management Committees with full information sharing are more effective than their 
Japanese counterparts.   
Finally, note that for Japan the estimated coefficient on JLMC is not as significant as the 
estimated coefficients on SFC, SGA and PSP yet it is negative, pointing to a negative association 
between JLMC and PROPOS, holding SFC, SGA and PSP as well as all other control variables 
constant. The negative coefficient on JLMC for the Japanese sample is significant only at the 10 
percent level, and is likely to be generated by a small number of unusual firms in Japan that use 
Joint Labor-Management Committees with full information sharing yet lack all other popular 
employee involvement programs such as Shopfloor Committees and Small Group Activities as 
well as profit sharing plans which are extremely popular in the electrical, electronic and 
information industries in Japan. As such, we ought not to over-interpret the result. With this 
caveat in mind, however, there are two possible interpretations of the observed contrast in the 
effectiveness of Joint Labor-Management Committees between the two nations, i.e., the positive 
and highly significant effect on the frequency of employee suggestions for productivity 
enhancement and quality improvement is found for Joint Labor-Management Committees in 
Korea, while no such positive effect for Japanese Joint Labor-Management Committees (in fact 
we find a negative effect though not highly significant).    28
For those who argue that employee involvement programs such as Shopfloor Committees 
and Small Group Activities lead to an erosion of union bargaining power (see, for example, 
Parker and Slaughter, 1988), such a finding would indicate that Japanese unions have been 
weakened as a result of Japan’s highly-developed employee involvement programs, that 
Japanese workers find the representative bodies (Joint Labor-Management Committees and 
union officials as labor representatives to the Committees in particular) do not function as well as 
the management-controlled programs such as Small Group Activities. Such an erosion of union 
bargaining power has not materialized in Korea, for employee involvement programs in Korea 
are still somewhat in their early stages.  
For those who are more sanguine about employee involvement programs, the finding can be 
viewed as a sort of “participation crowding out”. Specifically, once Japanese workers are 
provided with ample opportunities to participate via well-established Shopfloor Committees and 
Small Group Activities, representative participation such as Joint Labor-Management 
Committees may become redundant and less effective means to provide such local innovation 
opportunities.
22  For Korea where Shopfloor Committees and Small Group Activities still have 
weaker employee base and hence are less effective, Joint Labor-Management Committees do not 
overlap with Shopfloor Committees and Small Group Activities and remain effective in fostering 
employee involvement in firm performance activities.  
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
                                                 
22 Our finding is congruous to Kato and Owan (2009) which suggest that Japanese Joint Labor-
Management Committees may be used to facilitate vertical control by the management, and hence that team-
based instruments for shopfloor information sharing and local problem solving with active and frequent 
employee input) are less likely to be adopted in firms with Joint Labor-Management Committees.   29
Using a unique new survey of Japanese and Korean workers in the electrical, electronic 
and information industries, this paper has presented the first comparative evidence on (i) the 
strength of employee influence and voice; (ii) the use of HPWPs (High Performance Work 
Practices); and (iii) linkage between the use of such HPWPs and the strength of employee 
influence and voice, and consequently the extent of innovation at the grassroots level.  In so 
doing, this paper contributes to a small yet growing empirical literature which tries to go beyond 
a traditional question of whether or not HPWPs improve firm performance, and understand the 
actual process and mechanism through which HPWPs result in better enterprise performance.  
The High Performance Work System taps into each front-line worker’s initiative, creativity and 
resourcefulness.  To do so, the firm will need to foster a strong sense of empowerment and voice 
among workers by making each worker feel that: (i) his/her input counts; (ii) he/she is indeed 
provided with real substantive opportunities to participate and influence shopfloor decision 
making; and (iii) he/she actually take advantage of such opportunities to make suggestions to 
his/her boss concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality.  We have found 
systematic evidence suggesting that HPWPs are indeed contributing to the development of such 
a strong sense of employee empowerment and voice in Japan and Korea.   
  Traditionally both Korean and Japanese firms subscribed to the East Asian model of 
industrial relations, characterized by long-term employment, seniority-based wage and 
promotion system, enterprise-level unions, and HPWPs.  In recent years, however, Japan and 
Korea appeared to have parted; Japan maintaining its cooperative labor-management system in 
the main while Korea adopting the Anglo-American model of flexible labor market with more 
active external labor markets, accompanied by more confrontational and adversarial labor-
management relations.  We do not have evidence in support of such divergence between the two 
countries.  Overall, we find more commonalities than differences between Japan and Korea,   30
pointing to the continued importance of HPWPs in those two East Asian economies which are 
almost as large as the EU economies.   
While derived from the unusually reliable and representative survey with over 75 percent 
response rates with detailed information on each respondent, our data are still cross-sectional.  
As such, our estimates are subject to usual shortcomings of cross-sectional data such as 
unobserved worker heterogeneity.  Furthermore, there is a standard external validity issue.  To 
increase the external validity of our findings, we plan to expand the scope of our research project 
to include other Asian economies, in particular China and other industries, especially motor 
vehicles.          31
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 Table 1 Differences in Worker Characteristics between Japan and Korea
Japan Korea
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Japan-Korea difference
AGE 2489 36.119 7.857 1955 30.293 7.747 ***
MIDCAR 2514 0.226 0.418 1964 0.535 0.499 ***
MALE 2520 0.815 0.389 2076 0.560 0.497 ***
HIGHEDU 2511 0.537 0.499 2025 0.265 0.441 ***
NORANK 2535 0.628 0.484 1998 0.807 0.395 ***
ULBOT 2490 0.323 0.468 1940 0.010 0.099 ***
BLUE 2505 0.238 0.426 1913 0.520 0.500 ***
TECH 2505 0.397 0.489 1913 0.376 0.485
STAFF 2505 0.170 0.376 1913 0.053 0.224 ***
SALES 2505 0.139 0.346 1913 0.013 0.114 ***
UNION 2535 0.824 0.381 2145 0.733 0.443 ***
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
Japan-Korea Difference is based on two-sample test of means.
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level
AGE=employee's age
MIDCAR=1 if the ith employee is a mid-career hire, 0 otherwise.
MALE=1 if the ith employee is male, 0 otherwise.
HIGHEDU=1 if the ith employee has some college education, 0 otherwise.
NORANK=1 if the ith employee has no supervisory responsibilities, 0 otherwise.
ULBOT=1 if the ith employee is a grassroots-level union representative, 0 otherwise.  
BLUE=1 if the ith employee is working in production as an operator or a maitenance worker, 0 otherwise (omitted as a reference group).
TECH=1 if the ith employee is an engineer or a scientist, 0 otherwise.
STAFF=1 if the ith employee is working in accounting, finance, human resources and other staff functions, 0 otherwise.
SALES=1 if the ith employee is working in sales and marketing, 0 otherwise.
UNION=1 if the ith employee is an union member, 0 otherwise. Table 2 Differences in Voice between Japan and Korea
Japan Korea
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Japan-Korea difference
SVOJOB 2524 2.244 0.779 2084 1.536 0.769 ***
SVOGOL 2519 1.060 0.953 2066 1.104 0.780 *
SVOTIM 2517 1.205 1.084 2069 1.219 0.803
SVOTRA 2515 1.027 0.967 2078 1.094 0.712 ***
DVOJOB 2519 2.715 0.514 2053 2.181 0.698 ***
DVOGOL 2511 2.194 0.695 2038 1.997 0.773 ***
DVOTIM 2513 2.078 0.777 2038 1.997 0.753 ***
DVOTRA 2514 2.325 0.737 2047 1.982 0.731 ***
PROPOS 2530 1.719 0.780 2105 1.627 0.824 ***
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
Japan-Korea Difference is based on two-sample test of means.
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level
SVOJOB=3 if the ith employee has a lot of involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work;
SVOJOB=2 if the ith employee has some involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work;
SVOJOB=1 if the ith employee has little involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work;
SVOJOB=0 if the ith employee has no involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work.
SVOGOL=3 if the ith employee has a lot of involvement and influence on setting goals for his/her work group or department;
SVOGOL=2 if the ith employee has some involvement and influence on setting goals for his/her work group or department;
SVOGOL=1 if the ith employee has little involvement and influence on setting goals for his/her work group or department;
SVOGOL=0 if the ith employee has no involvement and influence on setting goals for his/her work group or department.
SVOTIM=3 if the ith employee has a lot of involvement and influence on setting work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off;
SVOTIM=2 if the ith employee has some involvement and influence on setting work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off;
SVOTIM=1 if the ith employee has little involvement and influence on setting work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off;
SVOTIM=0 if the ith employee has no involvement and influence on setting work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off;
SVOTRA=3 if the ith employee has a lot of involvement and influence on deciding what training is needed for people;
SVOTRA=2 if the ith employee has some involvement and influence on deciding what training is needed for people;
SVOTRA=1 if the ith employee has little involvement and influence on deciding what training is needed for people;
SVOTRA=0 if the ith employee has no involvement and influence on deciding what training is needed for people;
DVOJOB=3 if the ith employee considers it very important to has a lot of involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work;
DVOJOB=2 if the ith employee considers it somewhat important to have a lot of involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work;
DVOJOB=1 if the ith employee considers it not very important to have a lot of involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work;
DVOJOB=0 if the ith employee considers it not at all important to have a lot of involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work.
DVOGOL, DVOTIM, and DVOTRA are defined likewise.  
PROPOS=3 if the ith employee often makes suggestions to her boss concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality; 
PROPOS=2 if the ith employee sometimes makes suggestions to her boss concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality; 
PROPOS=1 if the ith employee rarely makes suggestions to her boss concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality; 
PROPOS=0 if the ith employee never makes suggestions to her boss concerning how to raise productivity and improve quality; Table 3 Differences in the use of HPWPs between Japan and Korea
Japan Korea
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Japan-Korea difference
SFC 2530 0.595 0.491 2098 0.697 0.460 ***
SGA 2526 0.428 0.495 2088 0.837 0.370 ***
JLMC 2513 0.088 0.283 2129 0.074 0.262 ***
SFCPART 1446 0.498 0.500 1442 0.197 0.398 ***
SGAPART 1074 0.846 0.361 1730 0.388 0.488 ***
PSP 2483 0.801 0.399 2145 0.657 0.475 ***
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
Japan-Korea Difference is based on two-sample test of means.
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level
SFC=1 if the ith employee works in a firm with Shopfloor Committees, 0 otherwise.
SGA=1 if the ith employee works in a firm with Small Group Activities, 0 otherwise.
JLMC=1 if the ith employee believes that nearly all information shared in Joint Labor-Management Committees 
is made available to him/her, 0 otherwise.   
SFCPART=1 if the ith employee almost always attends Shopfloor Committee meetings, 0 otherwise.
SGAPART=1 if the ith employee participates in Small Group Activities, 0 otherwise.
PSP=1 if the ith employee's compensation includes profit sharing bonus which is linked to firm performance, 0 otherwise. Table 4-1 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SFC
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 1.188 0.176 *** 2.287 0.174 *** -0.039 0.172 1.471 0.174 ***
SFC 0.167 0.047 *** 0.159 0.064 *** 0.321 0.046 *** 0.245 0.065 *** *
AGE 0.021 0.004 *** -0.018 0.004 *** *** 0.012 0.003 *** -0.010 0.004 ** ***
MIDCAR -0.094 0.067 -0.064 0.057 -0.017 0.065 -0.083 0.057
MALE 0.267 0.065 *** 0.308 0.064 *** 0.473 0.067 *** 0.190 0.064 ***
HIGHEDU 0.075 0.053 0.082 0.065 0.014 0.052 0.141 0.065 **
NORANK -0.440 0.055 *** -0.549 0.078 *** -0.650 0.052 *** -0.548 0.077 ***
ULBOT 0.100 0.052 ** 0.290 0.299 0.099 0.051 ** 0.813 0.296 *** ***
TECH 0.062 0.063 -0.154 0.061 *** *** -0.123 0.061 ** -0.116 0.061 **
STAFF 0.293 0.078 *** 0.044 0.131 * 0.039 0.076 0.290 0.130 ** **
SALES 0.338 0.080 *** -0.134 0.250 ** -0.257 0.078 *** 0.546 0.256 ** ***
UNION -0.081 0.076 -0.048 0.066 -0.097 0.075 -0.209 0.066 ***
Sample size 2436 1578 2431 1570
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -2509.261 -1718.874 -2856.162 -1710.714
Model χ
2 248.518 121.818 459.461 174.165
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 4-2 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SFC
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 0.508 0.169 *** 1.273 0.171 *** 0.199 0.171 1.715 0.176 ***
SFC 0.243 0.046 *** 0.248 0.064 *** 0.347 0.047 *** 0.204 0.066 *** ***
AGE -0.007 0.003 ** -0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 -0.011 0.004 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.022 0.065 -0.094 0.057 * -0.034 0.065 -0.052 0.058
MALE 0.164 0.065 *** 0.016 0.063 * 0.395 0.067 *** 0.014 0.065 ***
HIGHEDU 0.122 0.052 ** 0.186 0.065 *** 0.021 0.052 0.186 0.066 ***
NORANK -0.402 0.051 *** -0.465 0.077 *** -0.674 0.052 *** -0.616 0.078 *** ***
ULBOT 0.074 0.050 0.401 0.294 -0.019 0.051 0.818 0.289 *** *
TECH -0.077 0.061 -0.120 0.061 ** -0.148 0.062 *** -0.083 0.062
STAFF 0.048 0.075 0.190 0.130 0.100 0.076 0.281 0.132 **
SALES -0.085 0.076 0.208 0.256 0.102 0.076 -0.226 0.255
UNION 0.094 0.074 -0.052 0.066 -0.113 0.074 -0.126 0.067 *
Sample size 2428 1571 2427 1576
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -3195.528 -1789.688 -2893.081 -1591.026
Model χ
2 139.206 107.696 397.188 148.845
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 4-3 Possible interplay between SFC and UNION
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan Korea
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
SFC 0.164 0.110 0.352 0.154 ** 0.383 0.108 *** 0.321 0.152 **
UNION -0.083 0.101 0.150 0.158 -0.054 0.102 -0.131 0.157
UNION*SFC 0.004 0.121 -0.233 0.169 -0.075 0.120 -0.092 0.169
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan Korea
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
SFC 0.290 0.107 *** 0.203 0.151 0.322 0.107 *** 0.548 0.156 ***
UNION 0.127 0.100 -0.098 0.156 -0.131 0.101 0.229 0.161
UNION*SFC -0.057 0.118 0.055 0.167 0.031 0.119 -0.419 0.172 **
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
Based on the ordered probit estimations of Eqs. (1)-(4), augmented by an interaction term involving UNION and SFC.
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 5-1 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SGA
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 1.183 0.176 *** 2.353 0.168 *** -0.049 0.172 1.605 0.168 ***
SGA 0.168 0.047 *** 0.154 0.083 * 0.276 0.046 *** 0.239 0.084 ***
AGE 0.022 0.004 *** -0.018 0.004 *** *** 0.013 0.003 *** -0.012 0.004 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.100 0.067 -0.064 0.057 -0.027 0.066 -0.065 0.058
MALE 0.265 0.065 *** 0.324 0.064 *** 0.470 0.067 *** 0.209 0.064 *** ***
HIGHEDU 0.083 0.054 0.093 0.065 0.027 0.052 0.156 0.065 **
NORANK -0.454 0.055 *** -0.565 0.078 *** -0.673 0.052 *** -0.563 0.077 *** ***
ULBOT 0.100 0.052 * 0.267 0.299 0.102 0.051 ** 0.795 0.296 *** **
TECH 0.071 0.063 -0.171 0.061 *** *** -0.100 0.061 * -0.134 0.061 **
STAFF 0.324 0.079 *** 0.061 0.134 ** 0.102 0.076 0.274 0.132 **
SALES 0.353 0.080 *** -0.166 0.250 ** -0.224 0.078 *** 0.487 0.256 * ***
UNION -0.071 0.076 -0.128 0.071 * -0.071 0.075 -0.355 0.071 *** **
Sample size 2433 1574 2428 1566
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -2506.165 -1713.474 -2858.006 -1711.661
Model χ
2 249.551 124.559 448.723 171.207
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 5-2 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SGA
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 0.480 0.170 *** 1.377 0.165 *** 0.204 0.171 1.848 0.170 ***
SGA 0.270 0.045 *** 0.291 0.083 *** 0.274 0.046 *** 0.141 0.085 * **
AGE -0.007 0.003 ** -0.005 0.004 0.006 0.003 * -0.012 0.004 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.032 0.065 -0.095 0.057 * -0.044 0.066 -0.051 0.058
MALE 0.157 0.065 ** 0.025 0.063 0.395 0.067 *** 0.020 0.065 ***
HIGHEDU 0.135 0.052 *** 0.194 0.065 *** 0.030 0.052 0.195 0.066 ***
NORANK -0.421 0.051 *** -0.465 0.076 *** -0.695 0.052 *** -0.626 0.078 *** ***
ULBOT 0.069 0.050 0.384 0.294 -0.019 0.051 0.777 0.288 *** **
TECH -0.059 0.061 -0.136 0.061 ** -0.125 0.062 ** -0.108 0.062 *
STAFF 0.099 0.075 0.219 0.132 * 0.168 0.076 ** 0.268 0.134 **
SALES -0.054 0.076 0.148 0.256 0.134 0.077 * -0.274 0.255
UNION 0.117 0.074 -0.204 0.071 *** *** -0.086 0.074 -0.226 0.072 ***
Sample size 2425 1567 2424 1572
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -3187.209 -1794.347 -2897.899 -1596.175
Model χ
2 147.083 103.212 380.036 142.936
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 5-3 Accounting for a Possible Selection Issue with Small Group Activities
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan Korea
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
SGAALL 0.133 0.053 *** 0.169 0.090 * 0.273 0.053 *** 0.203 0.090 **
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan Korea
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
SGAALL 0.273 0.052 *** 0.272 0.089 *** 0.345 0.053 *** 0.096 0.091
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
SGAALL=1 if the ith employee works in a firm that has Small Group Activities currently or used to have Small Group Activities, 0 otherwise.
Based on the ordered probit estimations of Eqs. (1)-(4) with SGAALL used as an alternative to SGA.
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 5-4 Possible interplay between SGA and UNION
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan Korea
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
SGA 0.228 0.113 ** 0.124 0.102 0.352 0.109 *** 0.126 0.102
UNION -0.042 0.090 -0.201 0.158 -0.032 0.091 -0.637 0.162 ***
UNION*SGA -0.073 0.124 0.090 0.174 -0.092 0.120 0.344 0.178
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan Korea
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
SGA 0.287 0.108 *** 0.216 0.101 ** 0.338 0.108 *** 0.024 0.103
UNION 0.125 0.089 -0.389 0.160 ** -0.053 0.089 -0.518 0.163 ***
UNION*SGA -0.020 0.119 0.226 0.175 -0.077 0.119 0.357 0.179 **
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
Based on the ordered probit estimations of Eqs. (1)-(4), augmented by an interaction term involving UNION and SGA.
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 6-1 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of JLMC
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 1.249 0.175 *** 2.426 0.163 *** 0.052 0.171 1.722 0.163 ***
JLMC 0.328 0.086 *** 0.223 0.108 ** 0.057 0.079 0.273 0.108 ***
AGE 0.021 0.004 *** -0.018 0.004 *** *** 0.013 0.003 *** -0.012 0.004 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.084 0.067 -0.070 0.057 -0.014 0.066 -0.073 0.057
MALE 0.262 0.066 *** 0.291 0.064 *** 0.479 0.067 *** 0.178 0.064 *** ***
HIGHEDU 0.080 0.054 0.097 0.065 0.023 0.052 0.166 0.065 ***
NORANK -0.456 0.055 *** -0.538 0.077 *** -0.658 0.052 *** -0.551 0.077 *** ***
ULBOT 0.114 0.052 ** 0.265 0.298 0.121 0.051 ** 0.765 0.296 *** *
TECH 0.072 0.063 -0.166 0.060 *** *** -0.115 0.061 * -0.127 0.061 **
STAFF 0.289 0.079 *** 0.050 0.131 * 0.068 0.076 0.289 0.130 **
SALES 0.342 0.080 *** -0.142 0.250 ** -0.269 0.078 *** 0.511 0.256 ** ***
UNION -0.073 0.077 -0.096 0.065 -0.070 0.075 -0.280 0.065 *** *
Sample size 2421 1587 2416 1579
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -2495.143 -1732.337 -2860.838 -1727.289
Model χ
2 250.929 119.138 408.315 170.109
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 6-2 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of JLMC
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 0.590 0.169 *** 1.527 0.160 *** 0.307 0.171 * 1.919 0.164 ***
JLMC 0.172 0.079 ** 0.228 0.107 ** 0.105 0.079 0.173 0.109
AGE -0.007 0.003 ** -0.005 0.004 0.006 0.003 * -0.012 0.004 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.022 0.065 -0.098 0.057 * -0.031 0.066 -0.043 0.058
MALE 0.176 0.065 *** 0.016 0.063 * 0.402 0.067 *** -0.008 0.064 ***
HIGHEDU 0.130 0.052 *** 0.208 0.064 *** 0.023 0.052 0.198 0.066 ***
NORANK -0.410 0.052 *** -0.451 0.076 *** -0.682 0.052 *** -0.614 0.078 *** ***
ULBOT 0.087 0.050 * 0.357 0.294 0.000 0.051 0.774 0.288 *** **
TECH -0.082 0.061 -0.153 0.060 *** -0.141 0.062 ** -0.100 0.062 *
STAFF 0.060 0.075 0.185 0.130 0.132 0.076 * 0.279 0.132 **
SALES -0.097 0.077 0.160 0.255 0.092 0.077 -0.251 0.255
UNION 0.113 0.074 -0.125 0.065 ** ** -0.081 0.074 -0.188 0.066 ***
Sample size 2413.000 1580.000 2413.000 1585.000
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -3184.595 -1812.236 -2903.362 -1610.802
Model χ
2 116.366 98.685 340.613 142.994
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 6-3 Possible interplay between JLMC and UNION
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan Korea
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
JLMC 0.195 0.210 -0.037 0.309 0.346 0.189 ** 0.467 0.307
UNION -0.082 0.078 -0.106 0.066 -0.045 0.076 -0.272 0.066 ***
UNION*JLMC 0.159 0.230 0.295 0.329 -0.350 0.208 * -0.220 0.327
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan Korea
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
JLMC 0.539 0.186 *** 0.291 0.304 0.252 0.187 -0.108 0.312
UNION 0.145 0.076 * -0.123 0.065 * -0.069 0.076 -0.199 0.067 ***
UNION*JLMC -0.446 0.205 ** -0.072 0.324 -0.178 0.206 0.320 0.332
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
Based on the ordered probit estimations of Eqs. (1)-(4), augmented by an interaction term involving UNION and JLMC.
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 7-1 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SFC, SGA and JLMC
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 1.140 0.177 *** 2.247 0.177 *** -0.167 0.174 1.407 0.178 ***
SFC 0.132 0.048 *** 0.152 0.067 ** 0.287 0.047 *** 0.227 0.068 ***
SGA 0.138 0.048 *** 0.103 0.086 0.226 0.047 *** 0.180 0.087 **
JLMC 0.301 0.086 *** 0.203 0.109 * 0.004 0.080 0.269 0.109 *** *
AGE 0.021 0.004 *** -0.018 0.004 *** *** 0.012 0.003 *** -0.011 0.004 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.093 0.068 -0.057 0.058 -0.015 0.066 -0.072 0.058
MALE 0.261 0.066 *** 0.311 0.064 *** 0.474 0.068 *** 0.207 0.065 *** ***
HIGHEDU 0.080 0.054 0.086 0.066 0.026 0.053 0.147 0.066 **
NORANK -0.451 0.055 *** -0.570 0.078 *** -0.656 0.052 *** -0.556 0.078 *** ***
ULBOT 0.090 0.053 * 0.281 0.299 0.083 0.051 * 0.815 0.297 *** **
TECH 0.077 0.063 -0.145 0.062 ** *** -0.104 0.062 * -0.114 0.062 *
STAFF 0.294 0.079 *** 0.055 0.134 * 0.073 0.077 0.268 0.133 **
SALES 0.362 0.081 *** -0.122 0.250 ** -0.241 0.078 *** 0.555 0.257 ** ***
UNION -0.078 0.077 -0.089 0.075 -0.075 0.075 -0.295 0.075 *** *
Sample size 2418 1554 2413 1546
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -2479.640 -1691.653 -2820.986 -1678.161
Model χ
2 271.194 130.886 481.324 186.468
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 7-2 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SFC, SGA and JLMC
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 0.411 0.171 ** 1.230 0.174 *** 0.094 0.173 1.692 0.180 ***
SFC 0.203 0.047 *** 0.197 0.067 *** 0.310 0.048 *** 0.204 0.068 *** **
SGA 0.231 0.046 *** 0.227 0.086 *** 0.220 0.047 *** 0.081 0.088 *
JLMC 0.131 0.079 * 0.189 0.108 * 0.055 0.080 0.161 0.111
AGE -0.008 0.003 ** -0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 -0.012 0.005 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.028 0.065 -0.092 0.058 * -0.034 0.066 -0.041 0.059
MALE 0.165 0.066 *** 0.017 0.064 0.395 0.068 *** 0.021 0.065 ***
HIGHEDU 0.136 0.052 *** 0.191 0.065 *** 0.024 0.053 0.187 0.066 ***
NORANK -0.408 0.052 *** -0.470 0.077 *** -0.682 0.052 *** -0.626 0.079 *** ***
ULBOT 0.053 0.051 0.410 0.295 -0.041 0.051 0.820 0.289 *** **
TECH -0.070 0.061 -0.108 0.061 * -0.131 0.062 ** -0.089 0.063
STAFF 0.071 0.076 0.218 0.132 * 0.136 0.077 * 0.269 0.134 **
SALES -0.064 0.077 0.213 0.256 0.129 0.077 * -0.222 0.255
UNION 0.115 0.074 -0.146 0.075 ** ** -0.088 0.075 -0.169 0.076 **
Sample size 2410 1547 2410 1552
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -3153.909 -1760.518 -2860.781 -1565.548
Model χ
2 169.802 115.604 419.042 153.275
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 8-1 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SFCPART
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 1.270 0.239 *** 2.558 0.196 *** 0.009 0.228 1.814 0.195 ***
SFCPART 0.286 0.063 *** 0.317 0.083 *** 0.311 0.060 *** 0.256 0.082 ***
AGE 0.025 0.005 *** -0.019 0.005 *** *** 0.015 0.004 *** -0.013 0.005 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.136 0.091 -0.070 0.068 -0.016 0.086 -0.066 0.068
MALE 0.279 0.089 *** 0.270 0.075 *** 0.425 0.089 *** 0.225 0.075 *** **
HIGHEDU 0.014 0.072 0.089 0.076 -0.010 0.068 0.106 0.075
NORANK -0.417 0.073 *** -0.547 0.090 *** -0.648 0.068 *** -0.585 0.089 *** *
ULBOT 0.063 0.069 0.446 0.422 0.077 0.065 0.620 0.419
TECH 0.155 0.085 * -0.166 0.074 ** *** -0.081 0.080 -0.163 0.074 **
STAFF 0.341 0.102 *** -0.033 0.145 ** 0.128 0.097 0.269 0.144 *
SALES 0.438 0.111 *** -0.098 0.328 * -0.165 0.104 0.285 0.340
UNION -0.079 0.105 -0.086 0.074 -0.080 0.100 -0.232 0.074 ***
Sample size 1392 1142 1389 1134
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -1334.247 -1205.901 -1655.715 -1229.999
Model χ
2 178.695 99.322 269.902 127.405
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 8-2 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SFCPART
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 0.540 0.225 ** 1.525 0.191 *** 0.136 0.226 2.069 0.199 ***
SFCPART 0.258 0.059 *** 0.156 0.082 * * 0.277 0.059 *** 0.224 0.083 ***
AGE -0.008 0.004 * -0.003 0.005 0.012 0.004 *** -0.015 0.005 *** ***
MIDCAR 0.058 0.086 -0.057 0.068 -0.021 0.086 -0.006 0.069
MALE 0.194 0.087 ** 0.033 0.074 * 0.361 0.089 *** 0.013 0.076 ***
HIGHEDU 0.075 0.067 0.184 0.075 ** -0.004 0.068 0.137 0.076 *
NORANK -0.339 0.068 *** -0.508 0.089 *** -0.599 0.068 *** -0.652 0.091 ***
ULBOT 0.065 0.065 0.078 0.415 -0.013 0.065 0.506 0.424
TECH -0.060 0.080 -0.192 0.073 *** -0.117 0.080 -0.098 0.075
STAFF 0.083 0.096 0.043 0.143 0.128 0.097 0.224 0.146
SALES 0.021 0.102 -0.103 0.341 0.143 0.102 -0.268 0.329
UNION 0.133 0.099 -0.052 0.073 -0.061 0.098 -0.193 0.075 ***
Sample size 1387 1135 1388 1139
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -1860.593 -1291.804 -1690.282 -1139.991
Model χ
2 68.687 70.509 218.824 110.402
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 9-1 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SGAPART
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 1.540 0.279 *** 2.558 0.188 *** 0.650 0.270 ** 1.910 0.188 ***
SGAPART 0.352 0.099 *** 0.212 0.063 *** 0.334 0.098 *** 0.209 0.063 ***
AGE 0.018 0.005 *** -0.021 0.005 *** *** 0.005 0.005 -0.016 0.005 *** ***
MIDCAR -0.176 0.102 * -0.068 0.063 -0.164 0.098 * -0.123 0.063 **
MALE 0.216 0.107 ** 0.340 0.073 *** 0.349 0.107 *** 0.243 0.073 ***
HIGHEDU 0.067 0.085 0.070 0.073 0.007 0.081 0.067 0.073
NORANK -0.573 0.086 *** -0.640 0.090 *** -0.769 0.080 *** -0.624 0.089 *** ***
ULBOT -0.055 0.079 0.271 0.322 0.064 0.075 0.937 0.322 *** **
TECH 0.069 0.096 -0.169 0.068 *** * -0.151 0.092 * -0.116 0.068 *
STAFF 0.180 0.126 0.146 0.159 -0.001 0.119 0.570 0.158 *** ***
SALES 0.314 0.130 ** -0.032 0.289 -0.350 0.122 *** 0.699 0.299 ** ***
UNION -0.166 0.124 -0.108 0.080 -0.233 0.116 ** -0.296 0.080 ***
Sample size 1037 1302 1036 1295
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -1016.356 -1401.534 -1252.487 -1401.593
Model χ
2
126.207 124.209 192.867 166.064
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 9-2 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Voice of SGAPART
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 0.741 0.265 *** 1.694 0.184 *** 0.413 0.269 2.122 0.190 ***
SGAPART 0.205 0.097 ** 0.266 0.062 *** 0.239 0.098 ** 0.120 0.064 * *
AGE -0.012 0.005 ** -0.009 0.005 * 0.008 0.005 * -0.015 0.005 *** ***
MIDCAR 0.103 0.097 -0.131 0.062 ** ** -0.102 0.097 -0.096 0.064
MALE 0.241 0.106 ** 0.068 0.072 * 0.215 0.107 ** 0.034 0.074 *
HIGHEDU 0.183 0.081 ** 0.166 0.072 ** 0.112 0.081 0.134 0.074 *
NORANK -0.555 0.079 *** -0.550 0.089 *** * -0.765 0.079 *** -0.726 0.090 *** ***
ULBOT 0.045 0.075 0.431 0.319 0.056 0.076 0.760 0.310 *** *
TECH -0.031 0.091 -0.095 0.067 -0.132 0.092 -0.108 0.069
STAFF 0.069 0.119 0.330 0.157 ** 0.095 0.120 0.266 0.159 *
SALES -0.083 0.120 0.455 0.297 0.016 0.120 -0.132 0.295
UNION 0.134 0.116 -0.151 0.079 * ** -0.189 0.116 * -0.159 0.081 **
Sample size 1034 1296 1035 1301
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -1376.509 -1473.599 -1272.461 -1302.590
Model χ
2
81.107 115.084 169.599 123.197
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 10-1 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Demand for Voice of PSP
Voice on Job Voice on Goal
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 2.382 0.215 *** 2.120 0.174 *** * 2.276 0.179 *** 2.065 0.170 ***
PSP 0.167 0.070 ** -0.012 0.078 0.023 0.061 0.029 0.076
AGE 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.006 0.004
MIDCAR -0.052 0.078 0.010 0.059 -0.041 0.067 0.003 0.057
MALE 0.045 0.078 0.002 0.066 0.171 0.067 *** 0.132 0.064 **
HIGHEDU 0.105 0.063 * 0.104 0.067 -0.088 0.054 * 0.104 0.066 **
NORANK -0.143 0.064 ** -0.121 0.080 -0.097 0.054 * -0.063 0.078
ULBOT -0.021 0.061 0.137 0.301 0.058 0.052 0.455 0.297
TECH 0.017 0.073 -0.058 0.062 -0.157 0.063 *** -0.137 0.061 **
STAFF 0.187 0.093 ** 0.086 0.137 -0.033 0.079 -0.025 0.133
SALES 0.233 0.095 *** -0.003 0.257 -0.126 0.079 * 0.328 0.259 *
UNION -0.085 0.092 0.133 0.084 * -0.262 0.078 *** -0.123 0.082
Sample size 2405 1583 2397 1576
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -1534.163 -1565.548 -2399.814 -1737.570
Model χ
2 33.737 11.396 44.821 23.582
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 10-2 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Demand for Voice of PSP
Voice on Schedule Voice on Training
Japan Korea Japan vs. Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 2.481 0.174 *** 2.291 0.171 *** 1.783 0.181 *** 2.296 0.171 ***
PSP 0.040 0.059 -0.020 0.076 0.211 0.061 *** -0.100 0.076 ***
AGE -0.007 0.003 ** -0.012 0.004 *** 0.008 0.004 ** -0.010 0.004 ** ***
MIDCAR -0.069 0.065 0.011 0.058 -0.101 0.068 -0.020 0.058
MALE -0.150 0.066 ** -0.043 0.064 0.213 0.067 *** 0.097 0.064
HIGHEDU 0.000 0.052 0.044 0.066 0.048 0.054 0.050 0.066
NORANK -0.115 0.052 ** -0.069 0.078 -0.217 0.055 *** -0.140 0.078 * **
ULBOT -0.030 0.051 0.263 0.292 -0.040 0.053 0.657 0.303 **
TECH -0.126 0.062 ** -0.099 0.061 * -0.130 0.064 ** -0.054 0.061
STAFF -0.061 0.076 -0.033 0.133 -0.086 0.079 0.211 0.134 *
SALES -0.174 0.077 ** 0.122 0.254 0.072 0.081 0.049 0.253
UNION -0.023 0.075 0.024 0.082 -0.208 0.079 *** 0.114 0.083 ***
Sample size 2399 1576 2399 1579
Log of the 
Likelihood 
Function -2700.611 -1697.681 -2405.268 -1679.804
Model χ
2 21.362 15.546 86.293 23.103
Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent levelTable 11 Ordered Probit Estimates on the Effect on Employee Suggestion of SFC, SGA, JLMC, and PSP
Frequency of Employee Suggestion
Japan Korea Japan vs.
Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Korea
Constant 0.828 0.175 *** 1.166 0.182 ***
SFC 0.324 0.047 *** 0.316 0.067 ***
SGA 0.128 0.047 *** -0.101 0.086 ***
JLMC -0.132 0.080 * 0.514 0.112 *** ***
PSP 0.225 0.059 *** 0.027 0.076 **
AGE 0.011 0.003 *** 0.003 0.004
MIDCAR -0.028 0.066 -0.129 0.058 **
MALE 0.509 0.066 *** 0.355 0.064 ***
HIGHEDU 0.028 0.052 0.075 0.066
NORANK -0.423 0.053 *** -0.290 0.078 ***
ULBOT 0.095 0.052 * 0.297 0.290
TECH -0.048 0.062 -0.142 0.061 **
STAFF -0.030 0.077 -0.377 0.134 *** **
SALES 0.074 0.078 -0.181 0.251
UNION -0.224 0.076 *** 0.048 0.089 **
Sample size 2397 1559





Sources: Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey (JWRPS) 
and Korean Worker Representation and Participation Survey (KWRPS)
Notes:
The statistical significance of the difference in the estimated coefficients between Japan and Korea is tested by 
pooling the Japanese and Korean samples and estimating a benchmark model 
augmented by a full set of interation terms involving between each explanatory variable 
and Korea dummy (=1 if the ith employee works for a Korean firm, 0 otherwise).
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **Significant at the 5 percent level; ***Significant at the 1 percent level